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Abstract 
              Although the parliamentary elections run in Egypt in December 2011-
January 2012 indicated that Egypt is witnessing an era of political or democratic 
transformation, they signified the rise of political Islam to authority; the rise 
which created a lot of debates and posed a lot of questions about the political 
and economic future of Egypt. The core of these debates circles around these 
questions: Would Egypt adopt, literally, a rigid pro- Islamic type of rule based 
on the Islamic Sharia (Islamic Code) or would it adopt a moderate model, like 
that in Turkey, in its political and economic transformation? Pessimists think 
that Egypt will become another model of Iraq where national strife causes a lot 
of bloodshed or another model of Iran which gained a global antagonism. 
Optimists, on the other hand, aspire that Egypt will adopt a moderate pro-
Islamic model as Islam itself is called the religion of moderateness (Din al 
Aetedal wa al Wasatiya) and they suggest and appreciate that Egypt follows the 
steps taken by the Turkish party AKP ( Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), The Justice 
and Development Party in Turkey. They base their argument on the political 
and economic development witnessed by Turkey under the rule of the AKP. 
Moreover, they consider Turkey to be a Muslim but pro-Western and secular 
state, a “model” or “inspiration” for other Muslim countries. Though the author 
supports the optimists’ view, he thinks that Egypt faces a lot of barriers that 
                                                 
1
 Instructor of International Economics and International Politics at the Arab Academy for Science, Technology 
& Maritime Transport. 
I thank Miss Nadine Fakhry.M. for research help  
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 15, No. 1, May 2013 
 
65 
 
could hinder the achievement of these objectives or at least preclude their 
realization on the short run. 
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Introduction 
                  On Saturday the 21
st
 of January 2012, The Elections supreme 
commission in Egypt declared the final results of the Parliamentary elections 
which revealed to the public that political Islamic parties won the majority of 
seats in the revolutionary parliament. Even though the Islamic parties belong to 
different Islamic movements and adopt different contextual thinking, they are 
all classified under the notion of political Islam. If we have a look at the 
statistical results, we will find that the Freedom and Justice Party (the political 
wing of the Muslim Brother hood) won about 242 out of 498 seats, El Nour 
party (the political wing of the Salafi  Movements) won about 128, El Wafd 
party 38 , the coalition (ELKUTLA) 34, independents 20, EL Wast party 10, the 
Reparation and Development party 9, the Freedom party 5, National Egypt 
party 5, Egyptian Citizen party  5 and the Union party 2 of the total seats. This 
means that the Islamic parties won about 79. 48.1% out of the total seats in the 
parliament   (Freedom and Justice 48.5%, el Nour 26% and el Wast 4.98%) 
which implies that in a case of forming a coalition among these parties the 
Egyptian parliament will become a religious based parliament, which stimulates 
a lot of fear and suspicion among the Egyptian citizens who aspired to replace 
tyranny and autocracy with democracy, not with theocracy. Fears and 
suspicions arose that Egypt would become anther Iran, which is highly secluded 
from the international community and exposed to economic sanctions and 
political boycott from most of the countries, or  that Egypt would suffer and 
bleed from burning strife among the different sects in Egypt, particularly the 
Muslims and the Copts. Although these fears and doubts are justified and 
accepted to some extent, the majority of the Egyptians, including the author of 
this article, hope that Egypt is witnessing a step forward towards democratic 
transition. Before exaggerating in talks about hopes, we have to ask ourselves 
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certain questions which would clarify to a great extent the Egyptian situation, 
the current and the prospective. These questions first start with; do we need a 
model to adopt?  Is Turkey considered an appropriate model for the Arab spring 
countries, especially Egypt? Do the Egyptian Islamic parties, especially the 
Freedom and Justice Party, has a mindset or ideology similar or close to that of 
the Turkish AKP party   (Development and Justice Party) that could enable the 
Egyptian Islamic parties to lead Egypt to political stability and economic boom 
as is the case in Turkey?  What are the major barriers or obstacles that hinder 
Egypt from achieving these objectives? 
 
A Model for Change 
    Different terms have been used to describe what the Arab World had 
witnessed since the beginning of the year 2011, revolution, uprising, popular 
revolt, protests and demonstrations, etc.(1) Gilbert Achkar  commented on the 
Tunisian and Egyptian cases by saying that although what happened in both 
countries and the success of their revolutions to overthrow their regimes, we 
cannot describe this act which gave the impression that the regime was 
overthrown in accordance with the people's wishes, when in realty it was not, as 
it would be in a revolution.  This is because the revolution has not yet achieved 
all of its objectives, only the head and the most despotic and corrupt figures of 
the regime were removed but the back bone of the regime still survives. (2)   
     In my opinion, Achkar argument is correct, however, to succeed in their 
revolutionary process, revolutionists should listen to the voice of wisdom which 
requires that they stop revolting and demonstrating and calm down to rebuild 
their country. Egypt now is in a transitional state moving from a state of tyranny 
and despotism to a state of democracy and freedom.  Nevertheless, due to the 
long time of tyranny, and corruption, Egypt has lost its cohesiveness and even 
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its identity. Through the different regimes which ruled Egypt, Jamal Abdel 
Nasser with its anti western and pan- Arabism ideology, Sadat with his Arab 
boycott and pro-western ideology, and finally Mubarak with his total 
subjugation to the west, particularly, to the United States of America for the 
preservation of his authority and power, pushed Egypt to a state of internal 
disequilibrium. Generations differ in their ideologies through the three different 
reigns which ended with a confused and hesitating society. What escalates the 
problem is the rise of Islamic movements to authority through the last 
parliamentary elections which means that a new generation with a different 
religious ideology will appear on the scene. All of these different generations or 
different ideologies exist within Egyptian society, which is why conflicts are 
salient in Egypt. This pushes us to a fact that Egypt, necessarily, must adopt a 
model which melts all these differences together and allows them to coexist and 
creates a stable society. 
           Opinions differ about whether it would be better to adopt a model or not, 
and which country could stand as an appropriate model for Egypt. On one hand, 
some people argue that, apart from that fact that it is impossible for any country 
to clone the experience of another in governance, economy, or in value system, 
each country has its own unique characteristics which bear no resemblance 
whatsoever to the situation in other countries. For those who claim that Turkey 
is an excellent model for Egypt, the Turkish model has many characteristics that 
distinguish it totally and preclude its application in Egypt for the following 
reasons.(3) Considering the overwhelming majority of the Islamic parties in the 
Egyptian parliament, the most crucial factor in the Turkish experience over the 
past eight years has been the AKP, which has never cast itself as a religious 
party that has sought to transform the state into a form of theocracy; it has never 
opposed the secular values and never had as its principle objective the literal 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 
Vol. 15, No. 1, May 2013 
 
69 
 
application of Sharia law as understood by the Salafi movement. (4) In addition, 
to a large extent, the AKP adheres to the Western values. For example, the AKP 
adheres to democracy, the value which enabled it to come to authority in 2003 
in the context of a democratic system of government which was established in 
1946. The AKP operated in the context of a general aspiration to obtain 
European Union membership, a process that requires commitments to a range of 
political, economic and social reforms (Copenhagen Criteria).(5) On the whole, 
the Justice and Development Party(AKP ) offers a  model of secularism 
reconciled with religion . From this perspective, secularism is a system that 
guarantees every citizen the right to practice his or her religion freely without 
fear of punishment or exclusion from public life. (6)  
    Although the previous opinion may seem plausible to some extent, on the 
other hand some argue that states in transition must adopt a certain model from 
countries that witnessed economic boom and political stability and which have 
similar circumstances. Larry Diamond, a leading  scholar of democracy and 
democratization in the United States, underlines the importance of a model in 
inspiring reform and transformation among  Arab countries .(7) He cites that the  
absence of such a model in the Middle East is one of the set of factors that 
complicate prospects of democratization in the region.(8) Moreover, prominent 
personalities ranging from the Tunisian opposition leader, Rashid El Ganoushi ( 
the leader of Al Nahda Islamic party ) to the grandson of Hassan El Banna, the 
Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt , Tariq  Ramadan, had highlighted 
the importance of the model , the Turkish model, for the transformation of the 
Arab World. (9) Turkey was not only an appropriate model for the Arab 
countries but for the soviet republics which emerged after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as well. (10) The Economist announced Turkey to be the “star of 
Islam” and a model for the Central Asian republics especially. (11) Roughly a 
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decade later the idea of  Turkey as a model was raised once again, this time by 
the American president George Bush when he launched the BMENA initiative 
.(12) In both cases Turkey’s model credentials were based on Turkey being a 
secular Muslim country and a democracy with liberal market. (13)   
      Samuel Huntington in his seminal work on the “Third Wave” of 
democratization highlights the importance of the model and its demonstrative 
effect as a means of showing that  democratic change can happen and how it 
can happen.(14)  By demonstrative effect, Samuel means the successes achieved 
by a certain country that makes  this country a model of interest for other 
countries .(15) Therefore, if we apply the notion of the demonstrative effect on the 
case of the Turkish model , we will find that Turkey achieved a lot of economic 
and political successes, these successes are a function of three developments, 
the rise of the trading state, making Turkey visible through commerce, 
investment and trade,  in the diffusion of Turkey's democratization experience 
as a work in progress and the positive image of Turkey's new foreign policy, 
including the introduction at policies encouraging free movement of people 
between Turkey and the Middle East.   
         Concerning the three developments, if we shed light on Turkey as a 
successful trading state, we will find Turkish democracy has extended hand in 
hand with the growth of its economy and per capita income. (16) Economic 
development transforms societies in different ways, most importantly it enlarges 
the middle class, making it difficult to sustain the concentration of political 
power in the hands of narrow elite and encourage social capital to emerge 
thereby enriching civil society. (17) The Turkish economy which was closed and 
imports substitution oriented economy was transformed to an export oriented 
economy. Turkey's per capita income increased from about 1,300 USD in 1985 
to 2,773 USD in 1995 and finally almost 11,000 USD in 2008 and in 
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comparison with the agricultural sector which declined to a large extent, the 
manufacturing sector grew significantly together with the service sector. (18) 
These changes coincided with a period when Turkey became a trading state; 
Turkey's foreign trade grew from less than 20 billion USD in 1985 to more than 
330billon USD in 2008. Much more significantly in terms of the demonstrative 
effect, the Turkish trade with its immediate neighbors increased from about 4 
billion USD in 1991 to 82 billion USD in 2008. (19) These developments are 
significant for Turkey's neighborhood for different reasons, first they set an 
example of how economic success in the sense of how a transition from a 
primarily agriculture dominated import substitution economy to a globally 
competitive one and democratization has gone hand in hand, Turkish exports 
and investments make this relationship visible .(20) Secondly, especially as the 
Turkish economy is increasingly engaged in its neighborhood , there is a greater 
interaction between Turkish the business elite and the business people of the 
region, inevitably, issues of rule of law, accountability and transparency come 
up during conversation between the two sides .(21) Concerning the Turkish 
democratization process, it is clear that the Turkish democracy is itself a work 
in progress which, in turn, closes the otherwise large gap and also hierarchical 
relationship that inevitably forms between well established democracies and 
countries that are receiving democratic assistance. The fact that Turkey is still 
struggling with consolidating and deepening its democracy enables the Turkish 
side to relate to their neighbors  much more easily .(22) Turkey acting as a venue 
for gathering activists from the region becomes critical as they can get both 
firsthand experiences from their Turkish counterparts and see the work in 
progress for themselves. (23)  
    Turkey's demonstrative effect is highly explicit in Turkey's new   foreign 
policy. With the arrival of the Justice and Development party (AKP) to power 
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and the zero problems policy, Turkish relations with its neighbors  improved 
and expanded, and was accompanied by a growing interest to seek solutions to 
the problems of Turkey's neighborhood from Balkans to the Middle East .(24)The 
zero problems policy has engendered considerable Turkish involvement in 
regional issues ranging from  efforts to mediate between Arab / Palestinian and 
Israelis , between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
between Bosnia and Serbia and in resolving  bilateral  conflicts such as Cyprus 
and relations with Armenia .(25) Even if these mediation efforts have not always 
been very successful, it has nevertheless helped to change Turkey's image in the 
eyes of the Arab World; Turkey has come to be known as a country that speaks 
much more softly, multilaterally and cooperatively than others, and hence has 
been much more positively received. (26)  Another important aspect of Turkey's 
new foreign policy has been the close relationship that the government has 
developed with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, plus the bitter criticism it 
has directed towards Israel; these developments have made Erdogan particularly 
popular among the so called “Arab street" strengthening Turkey's demonstrative 
effect. (27) Finally, energetic efforts to primate a stable and prosperous 
neighborhood through encouraging greater economic integration between 
Turkey and the Arab world highlighted this demonstrative effect. (28)  
        Due to the successes of the AKP in the political and economic domains, 
most of the Egyptians wished to repeat the Turkish experience. Moderate 
Islamists, a booming economy, democracy, political stability, and a balanced 
foreign policy with the preservation of the Turkish identity are factors that 
attracted the Egyptian people to aspire to adopt the Turkish model. Turkey or 
the Turkish model changed from a source of aspiration for the Egyptians to a 
source of inspiration. What escalates the ambition of the Egyptian is the rise of 
the Islamic parties to power in the last election. Egyptian thought that the 
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Freedom and Justice party is the other face of the coin and that the first face is 
the Development and Justice party (AKP) but the former is in Egypt, while the 
latter is in Turkey. Egyptians who voted for the Egyptian Islamic party thought 
that this party has an ideology and a vision similar to the ideology and vision of 
the AKP, as they are both stemming from the same source of “Islam,” and 
therefore thought Egypt would witness the economic and political 
transformation witnessed by Turkey at the hands of the AKP. 
Although most of the Egyptians, with the ascendance of the Islamic parties, 
particularly Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) aspired for a moderate and modern 
Egypt, the evidence may let them down. 
\ 
 Evolution and ideology of the AKP and FJP  
A Comparative Perspective 
      Different theories tried to explain the causes of the evolution and resurgence 
of political Islam in different countries. To trace the reasons of this phenomenon 
implies to a large extent the mindsets and the ideologies that lie behind it. In 
other words, what stimulates and motivates Islamic movements to appear on the 
scene clarifies to a large extent the ideological context of these movements. In 
many of the studies concerned with the revival of political Islam, there is an 
implicit assumption that the revival is a result of relative depression in particular 
oppressive state policies and social injustice .(29) A general problem with this 
assumption is that it may explain the revival in some countries but not in others 
and  at  the moment there is no single theory that can account for the many faces 
of political Islam in such divers settings as for example, Turkey (democratic 
Islamism) , Iran  ( Islamic revolution ) and Egypt ( Islamist opposition).(30) 
Nevertheless, a range of theories, presented under three broad headings of  
Civilization, social, and textual, tried to explain the phenomenon. The first 
theory aims at explaining the dynamics of Islamic civilizations internally and 
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externally vis-à-vis an external power, the second theory focuses on social 
process, it locates the Islamic revival not in religion but in the social context in 
which it embedded and the third theory locates the Islamic revival in Islam's 
founding texts and doctrines as well as religious worship.(31)   
      If we try to use the previously mentioned theoretical contexts and apply 
them to the Islamic revival in Turkey and Egypt we will find that the 
civilization context explains to a large extent the Islamic revival in Turkey, 
while a mixture of the social and textual context explains the revival in Egypt, 
and this could be clarified in the following. 
     The idea of the clash of civilization has long been a powerful metaphor by 
which we can interpret the Islamic revival, the revival which stems from the 
clash between the Islamic civilization with its creeds and the western 
civilization with its secular values and practices, which put the Islamic values 
and practices at stake. In Turkey, Islamism has come to be associated with 
oppositions to the indigenous pro –western state ideology and values of 
kemalism, named after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ( 1881- 1938 ) who founded the 
modern republic out of the ruins of the Ottoman empire in 1923.(32) Ataturk 
regarded the form of Islam  as practiced under the Ottoman empire  an 
obscurantist obstacle to development; once Ataturk had consolidated his grip on 
power, he pushed through a series of reforms which gradually expunged Islam 
from public life.(33)These reforms included: 
1- The abolition of the Caliphate system, religious school and Islamic Sharia 
law courts and the subsequent introduction of new laws based on the 
Swiss civil, German criminal, and Italian economic codes. 
2- The closure of Islamic shrines, the banning of the religious brotherhood, 
known as Tarikat, the adoption of the western Gregorian calendar, and 
the granting of political rights to women. 
3- The removal of Islam as the state religion and the redesignation of Turkey 
as a secular state. 
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4- The adoption of European numerals and replacement of Arabic with a 
Latin script. 
5- The replacement of Arabic with Turkish for the call to prayer. 
6-   The change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday. 
   As a result, secularism in Turkey has come to mean not the removal of 
religion from the public sphere, but the replacement of one creed with another 
to the extent that women wearing head scarfs represents a political statement, an 
assault on the ideological foundations of the state. (34) 
     Ataturk's reforms triggered a series of rebellions which combined elements 
of Islamism. While the reforms had a major impact on Turkey's urban elite, they 
were less successful in penetrating rural areas, which still accounted for the vast 
majority of the population and where the practice of folk Islam continued with a 
little change. (35) But with the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1946, 
these rural areas were involved, as the nominees courted the rural conservative 
vote. The first to do so was the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes, prime 
minister in 1950 – 1960, who restored the call to prayer in Arabic, reintroduced 
religious lessons in schools, allowed Koranic recitations on radio, and built 
about 15000 mosques.(36) Not only did Menderes tolerate the re-emergence of 
the Tarikats but he actively sought the electoral endorsement of Said Nursi, the 
founder of the Nuxcu Tarikat, which grew to become the  second largest 
religious movement in the country after the Naqshabandi.(37) However in 1960 
Menders was toppled by a military coup and the Democrat Party was banned. 
Subsequence Islamic parties were established, the most explicit party was 
established by Necmettin Erbakan, a member of the Naqshabandi Tarikat; this 
party was called the National Order Party, however it was closed down 
following the 1971 military coup. Other Islamic parties were established 
subsequently, for example, the National Salvation Party and the Welfare Party 
which adopted a pro-Islamic policies, however the Welfare party faced the 
Kemalists pro-western military Junta measures of which the most prominent 
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measures were the 28th February 18 measures in 1997 to curb Islamist activity, 
ranging from restrictions on the Islamist media to the closure of private Koranic 
schools and courses, and the Welfare Party was closed down by the 
constitutional court and Erabakan was banned from politics for five years in 
1998 .(38) Following the closure of the Welfare Party , most of its members 
joined the Virtue party under the chairmanship of Recai Kutan, a long time 
confidante of  Erbakan, The Virtue Party was immediately faced with a 
dilemma as the other subsequent parties, particularly the Justice and 
Development party, ((the AKP) Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), if it appeared to be 
a continuation of the Welfare Party, it risked closure by the constitutional court, 
but if it distanced itself from the Welfare Party, it might lose its grass roots and 
alienate the party's former supporters. In the end, the Virtue Party, as its 
successor the AKP, opted for a more moderate image by repeatedly stressing its 
commitment to secularism and appointing a number of secular women to its 
national executive. (39) Although the AKP seemed similar to the Virtue Party, the 
case of AKP in Turkey is a unique experience and should be considered a new 
chapter in the history of Islamism. Even though the AKP has the support of 
religious people, it was able to change its understanding of religion and politics. 
It presents itself not as a representative of Islam but as a representative of 
conservative democrats, which means that secular tones determine the AKP 
political framework, not religious ones. AKP, as a conservative democratic 
party, defends change, reform, and transformation in favor of democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law. (40)  
     From what is mentioned above, it became obvious that political Islam in 
Turkey was not the progeny of Islamic fundamentalism or the desire to establish 
the Islamic state, however it was a sort of movement which opted to retrieve the 
Islamic rules in a society which was masked by a pro- western and secular 
values; or in other words, these movements tried to create a sort of coexistence 
between the pro- western secular creed and the Islamic creed which is inherent 
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in the Turkish society. Islamic parties in Turkey used the Islamic empathy to 
rally the support of the rural Muslim areas in their political struggles against the 
Kemalists, pro-western and secular military junta. Moreover AKP'S self-
definition as conservative democrat represents a great transformation regarding 
the role and function of religion in politics. AKP is no longer the representation 
of political Islamic, in other wards, AKP is not a religionist party, but religiosity 
is the aspect of its many members. AKP says yes to religiosity but says no 
religionism. (41) Although religiosity is an important aspect of individual and 
social life in Turkey, the majority of Turkish society does not support an 
Islamist regime. In other words, Turkish society demands a social Islam, not 
political Islam. (42)Therefore the conflict between Islam and secularism 
represents a difference of ideas and values, anti-Westernization is not a part of 
AKP'S political ideology and in AKP'S conservative democracy there is no 
room for political Islam. Since the issue of coexistence was preferred to the 
issue of replacement, there is a sort of harmony between allowing freedom of 
religiosity in society and adopting western principles in politics and economy. 
            The picture depicted above provides the most important pillars of the 
Turkish model: a bottom- up connection with Islam as opposed to a top-down 
and revolutionary version of Islamism. (43) The Turkish model emphasizes a 
more civil and tolerant connection with Islam as the Turkish Islamism promotes 
and motivates individuals to Islamize their environments through grass roots 
activism and solidarity by forming social networks, emphasizing education 
(both religious and secular) entrepreneurship, and the use of  the media. (44)   This 
bottom up connection also includes operating within the boundaries of 
democratic rules. Since the establishment of the National Order Party, Turkish 
Islamists have operated within the boundaries of a relatively well functioning 
democracy and internalized the democratic civic culture to a great extent. (45) 
The second pillar of the Turkish model lies at the Turkish Islamists connection 
with the idea of secularism. The AKP document states that the party considers 
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religion to be one of the most important institutions and secularism as a pre-
requisite for democracy, and it rejects the interpretation and distortion of 
secularism as enmity against religion. (46) Basically, secularism is a principle 
which allows people of all religions and beliefs to comfortably practice their 
religions, but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their lives 
along these lines.(47) From this point of view secularism is a principle of freedom 
and social peace. The AKP document refuses to take advantage of sacred 
religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes; it considers 
the attitudes and practices which disturb pious people and which discriminate 
them due to their religious lives and preferences as anti-democratic and in 
contradiction to human rights and freedoms. (48)  The third pillar of the Turkish 
model is the connection to the economy. The economic policy of the AKP 
supports some principles, the most prominent of which are: to favor a market 
mechanism that works with all its rules and institutions, that the state should not 
be involved in any kind of economic activity as the economic function of the 
state is regulatory and supervisory, that privatization is an important vehicle for 
the formation of a more rational economic structure, and that, finally,  foreign 
capital plays an important role in the transfer  of international know-how and 
experience, which contributes to the development of the Turkish economy. (49) 
          From this information, we can deduce that the AKP enjoys a sort of 
flexibility based on a comprehensive ideology, which contains all differences 
and melts them to serve and develop Turkish society. The AKP adopts a flexible 
vision of political Islam, a vision which coexists with ideas that are beneficial 
for the community as a whole, regardless of the sour of these ideas. 
  Since Islamic rituals are practiced freely in Turkish society and the Islamic 
creed retrieves its status and coexists with the western creed in the social 
context, and does not exceed the boundaries of this zone to the political and 
economic zones, the AKP as a party feels that it has fulfilled its obligation 
towards the sacred identity of Islam. It is not in the AKP'S agenda to establish 
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the theocratic state based on the application of Islamic Sharia. While the 
conflict was civilizational, a conflict between the western civilization and 
Islamic civilization, the outcome of this conflict was a compromise or a 
peaceful coexistence between the two civilizations. This coexistence stems from 
the fact that the AKP or the Turkish society as a whole does not consider the 
West to be an enemy, nor do they consider western values as values of the 
ignorant and the infidel society.  
       Although the Freedom and Justice party (FJP), the political hand of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, represents the strongest religious party in Egypt, it differs 
from its counterpart in Turkey, the AKP. The Muslim Brotherhood as a 
movement, initiated by Hassan El- Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community 
at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would find strength in the total 
self-sufficiency of Islam. (50) The leaders of the Brotherhood believed that Islam 
was no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total 
framework for all aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life in the 
Muslim world. (51) “Our duty as Muslim Brothers is to work for the reform of 
selves, of hearts and souls by joining them to God the all- high, then to organize 
our society to be fit for the virtuous community which commands the good and 
forbids evil- doing, then from the community will arise the good state. (52) The 
Muslim Brotherhood initially began as a twofold movement for the reform of 
both the individual and social morality; the movement stresses that Islam is 
comprehensive ideology for personal and public life and subsequently the 
foundation for Muslim state and society.(53 )Using the revivalist logic, the leaders 
of the movement called for a return to the Quran and the Sunna  and the practice 
of the early community to establish an Islamic state and a system of government 
through means of preaching the unity of religion and the state (din wa dowla).(54) 
According to the principles of the Brotherhood, no distinction is to be drawn 
between religious and secular law or the citizen and the believer, thus 
establishing a single state and society governed by Islam. (55) Therefore, the 
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Muslim Brotherhood wanted first to purify the individual through adopting the 
rules of Islamic Sharia embodied in the Quran and the Sunna, to purify the 
Muslim society from the sins and ignorance that prevailed due to the adherence 
of the Muslim rulers to the infidel Western values and ideologies and finally to 
establish the Islamic state or the state of the Islamic Caliphate. 
        The retrieval of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Islamic state 
through eliminating the ignorant society (Al Jahili) as an objective and a dream 
of the Muslim brotherhood confronted a lot of barriers through harsh and 
violent interactions with the subsequent governments from the late 1920s until 
they captured authority in 2012. During this long period, different causes 
enhanced the rise of this political religious movement. These causes clarify the 
social and textual context within which the movement grew, the textual context, 
represented in the texts of the Quran and the Sunna to which, if the individual 
and the society as a whole committed, they would become purified and the 
social context in which the members of the movement will confront the ignorant 
and infidel society with its evils and replace it by the utopian and Muslim 
society through the holy fighting (Jihad). The founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hassan El Banna, established an organization that provides people 
with the means of political expression as well as a positive direction towards 
social advancement through Islam. (56) The movement called attention to the 
notion that the society devoted to salvation produces virtuous citizens willing to 
relinquish individual gains to the collective group. (57) This allowed the finest 
people to emerge as social rulers, justifying the individual's attainment of power 
through the belief that one is merely serving the greater good of Islam and its 
people. (58) 
If the revival of political Islam in Turkey was manifested by the civilization 
conflict between the Western and Islamic creeds, or in other words, re- 
Islamizing the westernized Turkish society, the resurgence of political religious 
movements led by the prominent religious group, the Muslim Brotherhood 
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mobilization was initiated and consolidated by different factors. First, Hassan 
Al Banna was not only critical of the West and the debilitating ideas it deposited 
upon the Arab Muslim world, but also of the state of the third world and its 
inability to create its own success; Banna called upon the message of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to relieve the East from this tumultuous relationship. The 
disease affecting these Eastern nations assumes a variety of aspects and has 
many symptoms either politically, economically, or socially and culturally. (59) 
Second, the authoritarian regimes, starting with Nasser's regime, which 
prohibited all independent political groups including the Muslim Brotherhood 
as a religious political group, became one of the 1952 revolution's main victims 
after being officially outlawed as an opposition group when a member of the 
Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954. Under the reign of Sadat, 
the Muslim Brotherhood was given a little scope of liberty, as Sadat wanted to 
use the movement as a weapon against the leftists, but soon he changed his 
position and began to arrest and detain the leaders and members of the 
movement. Under Mubarak's reign the situation was worse than it was under 
Sadat, as the movement was prohibited from  being involved in politics, and 
was considered a prohibited group (Al Gamaa Al Mahzoura).Third, the most 
significant aspect of revivalism since the late 1970 is that it had become a part 
of a moderate, mainstream life within society, the cry for Islam was met by the 
educated and the uneducated, the young and the old, the peasants and the 
professionals and women and men, as Islam serves as a catalyst for change.(60) 
Islam provided a sense of identity as well as a common set of religious cultural 
values and legitimacy that effectively mobilized the population to revolt. 
Fourth, Egyptian society is formally depicted as a culture of alienation, and the 
absence of public opinion data may be the hardest form of evidence proving the 
political estrangement present. This setting of extreme alienation is an outcome 
of continual low voter turnout in parliamentary elections as well as a general 
lack of popular affiliation with the established and approved parties. This trend 
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of laxity adds to the discernment that the Egyptian political ethos has 
increasingly been characterized by isolation, defeatism, and influence; however, 
with the increase in the Brotherhood's popularity emerged an increasingly 
heightened and receptive populace. The people responded positively to the 
nature of the Islamic message within the political sphere. This massive increase 
in participation is indicative of the Egyptian society's perception of morality as 
the savior of a population in a state of decline.(61) Fifth, against the backdrop of a 
seemingly out of touch military bureaucratic state, the Islamic trend portrayed 
itself as the successor to a more human and responsive political tradition. This 
tradition could be traced back to the exemplary rule of the rightly guided caliphs 
of the first Islamic state. The Islamic trend was a servant of public interest, a 
state within a state.(62) 
The movement created new models of political leadership and community 
involvement, creating islands of democracy in a sea of dictatorship. The view 
point sought to slowly build a parallel society based on Islamic ideals by the 
power of example, through infiltration of the various systems and networks that 
reached out to the majority. (63) The group became closer to the political center 
within the state from the bottom up; Islamic mobilization on the periphery was 
not subject to centralized coordination and control within the government. The 
Brothers’ move from the periphery to the center of governmental politics 
enhanced the movement's political influence; however, it also exposed the 
organization and its leaders to new risks. (64)  Sixth, the state's continued 
unresponsive nature in dealing with economic problems, such as chronic under-
employment, offered an opening to the Muslim Brotherhood to capitalize on the 
misfortune of the people of Egypt who were suffering both at the hands of the 
economy and the government's unwillingness to mend the matter. (65) 
       From the abovementioned causes, the Muslim Brotherhood conceives itself 
to perform the activities of the Islamic call including involvement in politics and 
economics as well as social and cultural issues. The Brotherhood's goal is to 
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implement religious functions within the state of morality to prevail. Using the 
values concerning zeal and protection of religion, the group strives to protect 
the future of the Islamic state and secure the practice of religious rights; the 
movement has threatened to remove any factors that interfere with their goals.(66) 
This self- concept reflects to a large extent the type of mindset and the ideology 
which characterizes the Muslim Brotherhood, the mindset and ideology which 
impact their political and economic vision which was clearly observed in their 
documents which were publicized from 2004 to 2007. These documents 
identified the political framework of Egypt and the characteristics of its 
economic system. A close reading of the documents, statements and interviews 
by the Brotherhood’s leading figures reveals that there is a great deal of overlap 
between its religious and political functions, so that the political reform is 
viewed as part of religious reform.                  Hassan Al. Banna, the founder of 
the Brotherhood, based its concept of political reform on two different points; 
the rejection of externally imposed reform or measures taken under foreign 
pressure and setting up God's law through developing the Muslim individual, 
household, government and state to lead the other Islamic states. (67)  Regarding 
the first point, the Brotherhood is deeply suspicious of the real goals behind 
foreign imposed reform programs and does not believe them to be in the interest 
of the peoples of region. They perceive these programs’ aims as being to 
continue hegemony and control over the region's wealth and destiny, the 
supremacy of the Zionist entity which is usurping the land of Palestine and 
planting governments that are more cooperative with it in its overall strategy. (68) 
     The political project of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers seems to have three 
aims regarding setting up God’s law and the Islamic state: creating the faithful 
man, establishing theocratic polity, and enhancing the interventionist state. (69) 
       First, Hassan al-Banna viewed that purification of the society as a whole 
starts first with the purification of its individuals. The purified individual is the 
faithful man. The cornerstone of the Muslim Brother's strategy in Egypt, and in 
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the Islamic world at large, is the creation of a new man who will be devoid of 
sinful intentions, will have a good consciousness, and be ready to fulfill and 
serve the word of God. (70) To achieve this objective, the Brother's project clearly 
calls for the establishment of a near monopoly over the country's means of 
socialization, including the mosques, the media, and the school. (71)   After 
cleansing public institutions from all means of corruption, they will become the 
places of free opinion, the good word, the sublime art, to respect the constants 
of the nation, or the principles of the religion of Islam as the Muslim Brothers 
interpret them.(72) Second, as stated before, the Muslim Brotherhood initially 
began as a twofold movement stressing Islam as a comprehensive ideology for 
personal and public life and the foundation of a Muslim state and society. 
Returning to Islamic principles stated in the Quranic verses, the Sunna and the 
practices of the early community will enable Muslims to establish the Islamic 
state. Although Muslim Brothers have repeatedly rejected the allegation that 
they aim to establish a theocratic and a religious state, they have sought to 
advance the prospects of an Islamic, religious, and theocratic state in a variety 
of ways. First, they rely heavily on the second article of the Egyptian 
constitution which states that Islam is the religion of the state and the principles 
of the Sharia are the main source of jurisprudence .(73) Second, the Muslim 
Brothers insist on slogans and political symbols that are religious and theocratic. 
For example, they use slogans like “Islam is the solution.”(74) Third, the Brother's 
draft party platform stipulates that the state has essential religious functions and 
that these religious functions are implemented by the head of the state. (75) 
Fourth, non- Muslims, e.g. Copts are excluded from official positions because 
these position entail religious functions which can not be performed by non- 
Muslims. (76) 
            Regarding the interventionist state, the Muslim Brothers are concerned 
mainly about the economic reform. They believe that to enhance economic 
growth and foster economic development, the state must assume an 
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interventionist role in running the economy and society, and they suggested that 
they would end the privatization of public sector companies that is intended to 
reform the Egyptian economy. With this in mind, the Brothers suggest that 
Egypt's economy should first achieve self – sufficiency in the vital areas of 
food, medicine, and armaments with the goal of providing for the needs of its 
citizens and improving the environment, while ensuring safety.(77) Moreover, 
they propose to increase governmental investments in the service sectors that 
intend to improve the quality of those services and to increase employment 
opportunities. (78) In addition, the Brothers propose gigantic national projects to 
develop the marginalized, for example, Sinai and the western desert. Clearly, a 
state organized along such lines will exert a totalitarian reach over the entire 
Egyptian polity, as has been the case in the past with Third world countries, 
including Egypt. (79)  
       The Brotherhood's financial system can be outlined based on the following 
points: First, restructuring the financial system through two principal 
mechanisms, abolishing the usury system "interest rate" and converting banks 
and financial institutions into investment institutions so their function is to 
invest deposits and other financial instruments, rather than trading in money 
through interest rate bearing loans.(80) The Brotherhood platform reaffirms the 
Islamic investment models, particularly, “Musharka,” venture capital, “al Buyu” 
sales, and  “al Ajar” leasing contracts. (81)The Brotherhood's stance is based on 
the belief that profit is the product of relationship between capital and labor i.e., 
the product of investing capital in economic work, and thus it rejects the idea of 
profiting by trading in money and currency. (82)  The second point is in 
preserving the state's socio-economic role.  The state is the guide, the planner, 
and responsible for handling crises and combating exploitation through 
breaking up monopolies and scams, and controlling prices to safeguard the poor 
and manage Islamic endowments. (83) Third, belief in the idea of class distinction 
within society and protecting both the wealthy and poor classes alike. The state 
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ensures that the wealthy fulfill their obligations to the poor through zakat, 
charity and taxes, as key financial tools. The goal of these institutions is not 
achieving class equality in society, but rather to ensure a dignified lifestyle for 
the poor. (84) 
 
Conclusion 
      Some analysts have maintained that past revolutionary Egypt could clone 
the Turkish model for political and economic transformation, especially with a 
parliament composed of religious-based members similar to the Freedom and 
Justice Party. Unfortunately this was not the case. First, the Egyptian revolution 
was not a complete revolution as it has not yet fully achieved its objectives; 
therefore, Egypt is not ripe enough to adopt any model. Although the FJP in 
Egypt and the AKP in Turkey came from religious vacuum, the AKP never cast 
itself as a religious party, while the FJP never denied its identity as a religious 
party. The religious party is the party whose ideology is derived from and 
shaped by religious ideas, and which mobilizes the grass roots on the basis of a 
shared religious identity.  This sort of party seeks regime change by 
implementing their religious views, the Islamization of the state and society, 
and overcoming class and ethnic divisions on the basis of a shared religious 
affiliation. (85) The AKP never sought to transform the state into a form of 
theocracy. It has never opposed secular values and never has as its principal aim 
the application of Sharia law. In regards to the economy, the AKP adopted the 
noninterventionist role of the state and favored an economy controlled by 
market mechanism, with the state taking on only a regulatory rule. On the other 
hand, the FJP strives to establish the religious state, the Islamic state, and 
retrieve the state of Islamic Caliphate, the literal application of the Islamic 
Sharia. Any society which does not apply the Sharia is an ignorant society and 
to overcome this infidel society holy fighting (Al Jihad) must be adopted. The 
FJP uses the religious bases and sentiments to mobilize the grass roots. 
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Moreover, this Islamic state must adopt an interventionist role in all issues, 
especially the economy of the state, to safeguard social justice.  
The differences between the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and the AKP, 
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, clarify that the application of the 
Turkish model in post-revolutionary Egypt could never be successful, due to the 
different ideologies adopted by the two Islamic parties in each country. 
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